Introduction
This chapter investigates the current Danish unemployment policy regime from the perspective of the cash benefit recipient. The main goal of the policy is to move unemployed clients closer toward labor market participation. We question whether policy instruments, such as curtailing benefits and using economic sanctions in order to promote motivation and thereby enhance job opportunities, also present a risk to the livelihood of the most vulnerable unemployed.
We make an empirical investigation of the theoretical concept of risk applied to the case of cash benefit recipients. A cash benefit is a temporary, monthly benefit that is conditional on a set of eligibility criteria and is means tested. It is the last resort for those who have no other source of income. We draw on the idea of risk control related to a gradual transition from welfare to workfare. Thus, we focus first and foremost on risk perspectives that investigate how unemployed citizens are governed via policy instruments that encourage the unemployed to seek work and thereby avoid the risk of being financially penalized.
The chapter takes a theoretical point of departure in a governmentality-inspired understanding of risk. The governmentality of current employment policy in both Denmark and other OECD countries considers the unemployed individual as a rational entity who is a capable, responsible, and self-governed individual. Clients receiving cash benefits tend to have difficulties exiting the position of welfare recipients
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and (re)entering the labor market. The pressure to behave responsibly not only contains risk, but also enhances a job focus and thus creates opportunities for some unemployed. If the unemployed individual is deemed by the unemployment system to behave "irresponsibly and irrational [ly] ," there are consequences such as curtailment of benefits or financial sanctions. We focus on one hand on the intended risk control of the unemployment policy (getting clients to work) by applying policy tools such as financial sanctions, and on the other hand on the unintended consequences in terms of poverty and aggravated living conditions for vulnerable clients.
Throughout the chapter we primarily focus on the latter. There is a specific perspective at play in this chapter, namely that of the client. While the risk perspective is inherent in the active labor market policy, it is also present in the lives of the clients at whom this policy is directed. Thus we address risk as something that is experienced by clients. Our empirical analysis shows how risks are perceived and experienced by cash benefit recipients, and ultimately may have consequences for some of the most vulnerable groups in Danish society beyond those intended.
First, we look into the barriers that some citizens face in relation to achieving employment. Second, we discuss possible consequences of not reacting to or being unable to react to the existence of risks connected to being unemployed and unable to adhere to the demands of current policies. These risks include increased poverty, debt, marginalization, depression, stigma, shame, and a spoiled self-identity. This chapter includes a focus on what happens when the risks are no longer just risks, but become consequences to clients as deteriorating living conditions.
In the analysis we draw on the empirical results from three different Danish studies carried out during the period from 2008 to 2013 (M ü ller et al., 2010; Ejrn ae s, Hansen, and Larsen, 2010; Caswell et al., 2011; Sieling, 2012) . The studies apply both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The nature of the empirical material across the different studies enables us to analyze risk from the perspective of the cash benefit recipients.
Unemployment, the Cash Benefit System, and the Clients
To contextualize the analysis we will describe the development in unemployment levels, and the characteristics of the cash benefit system with the most recent changes therein. Furthermore, we will
